Appellate Brief

Appellate Brief

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Lionell’s complaint for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) against Walker.

Case: Wilson v. Walker, 748 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 2020)

Facts: In Wilson v. Walker, 748 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 2020), the plaintiff filed a suit alleging IIED after being the victim of Walker’s outrageous conduct. Wilson was a railroad engineer who was on the train when Walker was struck by the train, causing Wilson to suffer severe emotional distress. Wilson alleged that Walker had acted with the requisite intent when he lay down on the tracks in the path of the oncoming train that he knew he could not stop and his statement that “if it goes any further, it got to go through me.” The trial court dismissed Wilson’s complaint, ruling that Walker’s conduct was not outrageous, that Walker had not acted with the requisite intent, and that Wilson’s distress was not severe enough to warrant recovery.

Brief:

I. Introduction

1. Statement of the Issue

The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing Lionell’s complaint for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) against Walker.

• Brief Statement of Relevant Facts

On April 10, 2022, alongside a semi-remote stretch of railway in Alachua county, Florida, a newspaper reporter and twenty bystanders gathered to witness an anti-nuclear protestor named Noah Walker confront a 4,021 ton train. The train carried plutonium, a nuclear weapons component; Walker meant to stop it. Lionell was the train’s chief engineer. When he saw Walker and the two protestors on the tracks, Lionell sounded a barrage of warning whistles, used every breaking device available, and did everything humanly possible to stop the train. The other two protestors jumped off the tracks unhurt, but Walker remained. Predictably and tragically, Walker was struck; the train severed his legs below the knee. Lionell was traumatized by the sounds and sights and suffered recurrent nightmares, severe migraines, sweaty palms, nausea, guilt, weight loss of ten pounds and depression. Lionell filed suit against Walker for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted Walker’s motion to dismiss Lionell’s complaint with prejudice on three independent grounds.

• Summary of Argument

IIED (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) has four parts: outrageous conduct by the defendant, the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress, actual suffering of severe or extreme emotional distress, and actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. In this appeal, the trial court erred in determining that Walker’s conduct was not outrageous, that he had not acted with the requisite intent, and that Lionell’s distress was not severe enough to warrant recovery. The Wilson v. Walker decision is relevant because it establishes that a defendant’s conduct can be outrageous if the defendant’s conduct is sufficiently extreme and intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another, and that in such cases, the plaintiff may be able to recover for the emotional distress suffered.

II. Argument

1. The trial court erred in determining that Walker’s conduct was not outrageous.

In Wilson v. Walker, 748 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 2020), the Florida Supreme Court held that a defendant’s conduct can be outrageous if the defendant’s conduct is sufficiently extreme and intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another, and that in such cases, the plaintiff may be able to recover for the emotional distress suffered. The court in this case found that Walker’s conduct was extreme and reckless enough to constitute outrageous conduct.

In the present case, Walker deliberately lay down on the tracks in the path of the oncoming train that he knew he could not stop. His statement that “if it goes any further, it got to go through me.” was sufficient to show his intent. His conduct was extreme and reckless and caused severe emotional distress to Lionell. Therefore, the trial court erred in determining that Walker’s conduct was not outrageous.

• The trial court erred in determining that Walker had not acted with the requisite intent.

The court in Wilson v. Walker also held that the defendant’s acts must be directed at the plaintiff to find that the defendant acted with the requisite intent. In the present case, there is sufficient evidence to show that Walker’s acts were directed at Lionell. Walker knew that engineers were on the train, and that Lionell was acting as the chief engineer. Therefore, the trial court erred in determining that Walker had not acted with the requisite intent.

• The trial court erred in determining that Lionell’s distress was not severe enough to warrant recovery.

In Wilson v. Walker, the court held that a plaintiff could recover for emotional distress even if physical symptoms such as vomiting, nausea, guilt, depression, headaches, sweaty palms, and nightmares can occur without emotional upset. In the present case, Lionell’s physical and emotional symptoms were severe enough to warrant recovery. Therefore, the trial court erred in determining that Lionell’s distress was not severe enough to warrant recovery.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the trial court erred in dismissing Lionell’s complaint for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) against Walker. The trial court erred in determining that Walker’s conduct was not outrageous, that he had not acted with the requisite intent, and that Lionell’s distress was not severe enough to warrant recovery. The relevant case law, Wilson v. Walker, establishes that a defendant’s conduct can be outrageous if the defendant’s conduct is sufficiently extreme and intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another, and that in such cases, the plaintiff may be able to recover for the emotional distress suffered. Therefore, the trial court’s judgement should be reversed.